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Faculty Pro Bono and

the Question of Identity
David Luban
My aim in this essay is to explain and defend a simple proposition, which I'll
call the pro bono thesis: law teachers and law schools have the same pro bono
responsibilities as lawyers and law firms. By "pro bono" I mean something
more particular than community service or civic involvement. I mean free or
reduced-rate legal work for those who cannot afford to pay for it. The pro
bono thesis is that law teachers and law schools have pro bono responsibilities
in this sense.
What, exactly, are those responsibilities? In discussions of pro bono, four
issues stand out, and I must begin by explaining where the pro bono thesis
that I am defending comes out on these issues.
First is the question whether the pro bono standard should be mandatory.
Early drafts of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct imposed a
mandatory requirement, but it was withdrawn in the face of withering opposition and replaced with a rule (Model Rule 6.1) that is merely precatory-the
only precatory rule in the document. Robert Kutak, the head of the ABA
committee that drafted the Model Rules, recalled to me that during hearings
on an early draft one lawyer stood up and denounced the mandatory pro
bono rule as tantamount to slavery-adding that, as we all know, slavery has
been outlawed since the Magna Carta.
The comment may have been farcical, and ever so revealing, but the
sentiment was serious. Many lawyers and scholars, myself included, have
argued over the years for mandatory pro bono. But mandatory proposals have
always met with hostility, and in my view the prospects for mandatory pro bono
are so dim that it is a waste of time to continue talking about it.' It merely
distracts from serious acknowledgment of the moral responsibility to perform
pro bono service without an enforceable rule-and it is that I mean in the pro
bono thesis.
. No public service obligation that nearly every lawyer resents and objects to
is likely to help the clients it is meant to serve. For that reason, I have come to
think that critics are right who argue that the pro bono obligation is unsuitDavid Luban is the FrederickJ. Haas professor of law and philosophy at Georgetown University.
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able to enforce by a rule. But they are wrong if they deny that pro bono is an
obligation, merely because it is a moral rather than a legal obligation. In
Kant's language, it is an imperfect duty-a duty that allows for exceptions based
on our inclinations; it is also a wide duty, like the duty of charity, in the sense
that it is up to each lawyer to decide the time, place, and manner of discharging it.2 But, as Kant cautions, "a wide duty is not to be taken as permission to
make exceptions to the maxim of actions .... ,,3 An imperfect and wide duty is
a duty nonetheless.
Lawyers sometimes describe unenforced duties as "aspirational," and I will
accept this label, provided we understand that "aspirational" doesn't describe
only unattainable perfectionist ideals, like leading a sin-free life, but also
perfectly doable aspirations, like trying to get an hour of exercise a week. All it
takes to fulfill aspirations like these is a minimally settled life and somewhat
better than average organization and resolve. Pro bono is an achievable
aspiration, not an unattainable ideal.
The second point of contention is how broadly the concept of pro bono
should be understood. Many lawyers consider any reduced-cost law-related
work, like service on bar committees, to be pro bono that discharges their
responsibility.4 Others disagree, insisting that pro bono should be directed at
the genuinely needy. The ABA rule originally declined to specify what counts
as pro bono, in effect ratifying the inclusive conception. But after many years
of vigorous debate the ABA in 1993 chose the second course, and the current
version of Rule 6.1 asks lawyers to provide "a substantial majority" of their pro
bono hours to persons of limited means or organizations designed primarily
to address their needs.
I think this is as it should be. Donating legal expertise to any worthwhile
cause or client is commendable, but it is hard to see why lawyers have a moral
responsibility to provide free service to clients who could readily pay for it.
The fact that there would surely be no pro bono obligation if evieryone could
afford a lawyer demonstrates that the pro bono obligation is predicated on
need. It can no more be discharged by aiding the nonneedy than an obliga-
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The distinction between wide and narrow duties comes from Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor, 194 (NewYork, 1991) [hereinafter Kant, Metaphysics], sec.
7 of the "Doctrine of Virtue" (Tugendlehre) page 390 of the standard K6nigliche Preussische
Akademie der Wissenschaft Ausgabe-as does the argument that duties of virtue, unlike laws,
are wide, and their obligation is imperfect.*Kant explains that a duty is wide if "it leaves a
latitude (latiludo) for free choice in following (complying with) the law, that is, that the law
cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act-and how much one is to do by the action for
an end that is also a duty." The distinction between perfect and imperfect duties comes from
Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals with Critical Essays, ed. Robert
Paul Wolff, trans. Lewis White Beck, 45n. (Indianapolis, 1969)-page 421n. of the Akademie
]
Ausgabe. There Kant writes, "[B y a perfect duty I here understand a duty which permits no
exception in the interest of inclination .... "An imperfect duty, then, allows people to beg off
sometimes because they don't want to carry it out.
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clients. Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 283, 291
(1998).
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don to feed the hungry could be discharged by taking the prosperous and well
fed out to dinner.
Third is the question of how much pro bono is enough. Early drafts of the
ABA Model Rule specified a minimum of forty hours per year, but the version
of Rule 1.6 that the ABA House of Delegates finally adopted declined to
specify, stating merely that every lawyer should perform some pro bono.
Eventually the rule was amended back in the direction of the early drafts, and
it now recommends at least fifty hours of pro bono a year. Plainly, any number
you choose is arbitrary, and inserting an arbitrary number into the rule makes
the rule harder to defend as a moral obligation. But to revert to a rule that
specifies no minimum amount provides insufficient guidance; it comes close
to no obligation at all. Fifty hours, which amounts to an hour a week, seems
like a feasible request.
Fourth, and last, is the question whether pro bono must be provided
personally. Rule 6.1 answers yes. In its comment, however, it recognizes that
"there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage in pro bono
services" and states that at such times a lawyer may discharge the obligation by
contributing a reasonable financial equivalent of the pro bono hours to legal
aid organizations. The comment also adds that law firms may provide their
pro bono services collectively, without each lawyer's personally contributing
fifty hours-a point that will figure in my discussion of the pro bono thesis for
law schools.
I part company with the rigorist text of Rule 6.1 and opt for the policies in
the commentary. In line with the idea that pro bono is an imperfect duty, I
accept that lawyers who find it too inconvenient to discharge personally can
substitute a financial contribution; and in line with the idea that pro bono is a
wide duty, which leaves the means for discharging it up to the lawyer, I accept
that law firms (and law schools) can organize to discharge their members'
responsibilities collectively, without every member's personally performing
pro bono service.
Individual jurisdictions often part company with the Model Rule on one or
more of these four issues, and I don't for a moment suggest that the ABA rule
represents the dominant view of the practicing bar. But I propose to take the
ABA rule as my point of departure,°and as we think about law teachers and law
schools, let the record reflect the official view of the practicing bar's most
influential organization: that every lawyer should devote at least fifty hours a
year to pro bono service, mostly on behalf of low-income clients, or otherwise
ensure that fifty hours a year of legal service to the needy gets performed. That
is the standard I believe law teachers should meet.
Why should law teachers meet it? In one sense, the answer is trivially
straightforward. Law teachers are, by and large, lawyers, and Rule 6.1 sets out
the pro bono responsibilities of lawyers. The rule contains no exception for
lawyers who happen to be academics. To many colleagues who do pro bono,
this syllogism is so obvious that it hardly needs to be stated.
To others, however, nothing about it is obvious. It is not obvious that
academic lawyers are lawyers in the sense contemplated by the rule, and one
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might argue that the nonapplicability of the rule to professors is so firmly
entrenched that the exception for academic lawyers should be read into the
rule even without explicit language. Furthermore, until we understand the
ground of the obligation that Rule 6.1 formulates, it is unclear whether the
obligation is genuine. If it is genuine, its rationale may turn out to apply only
to private practitioners of law, not to law teachers. 5
Deep down, these concerns turn on what I will call the "question of
identity." Who are we as law teachers? What is our professional identity? Is a
lawyer-scholar more like a lawyer, or more like a scholar?
We will have to address all these questions, but the one I will start with is the
question why any lawyers have pro bono responsibilities. That is, suppose we
ask a question other than whether pro bono should be mandatory. Why
should it even be aspirational? Is there any reason beyond personal inclination why lawyers should perform pro bono service?
Lawyers' Pro Bono Obligation
Start with the unsuccessful arguments for pro bono. The fact that the bar
has enacted an aspirational pro bono rule is at best a weak reason, and
perhaps no reason at all, for the duty. ABA rules have no force of law; in any
event, fewer than half of all lawyers belong to the ABA, and the current ABA
rule was controversial even within this quite unrepresentative body (it passed
in the House of Delegates by a slim 228/215 margin). It is true that most state
ethics codes have adopted variants of the ABA rule, but that proves very little.
State ethics codes are court rules, and the court-appointed bar committees
that draft them and make recommendations are by no means representative
of either the bar as a whole or the public at large. A purely hortatory rule
drafted by an unrepresentative committee and promulgated by appellate
judges represents nothing more than the opinion of the committee members
and the judges of what it would be good for lawyers to do. Because it is an
opinion that courts do not think it appropriate to enforce, it lacks the normative force of law or even of other court rules. It is nothing more than something that a handful of lawyers and judges think is a nice idea.
Supporters of pro bono usually offer two additional reasons why lawyers
should perform it. The first is that pro bono service is a tradition of the bar;
5.

Some might also argue that institutional recognition of a pro bono obligation is inconsistent
with individual teachers' academic freedom. It may also be inconsistent with the academy's

implicit social contract: the academy possesses freedom of thought, to a level unusual in
human history, but in return it withdraws from the world of practical affairs. As the current
controversy over Louisiana's Tulane rule demonstrates, a law school breaks that contract at
its peril.
These are serious concerns, but a full-scale response is more than I can undertake here. I
cannot see how nonmandatory pro bono policies interfere with academic freedom, even if
they have practical consequences such as rewarding pro bono with merit raises. The risk of
political backlash against faculty pro bono activities is a very real threat, particularly if faculty
members discharge their pro bono responsibilities by representing controversial causesand then it is the institution's job to defend academic freedom by supporting those faculty.
But it is more likely that faculty involvement in public service activities will win the institution
praise and friendship rather than backlash, because most legal services for low-income
people are rather uncontroversial.
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the second is that there is a tremendous need for pro bono. Unfortunately,
neither of these is more than a half-argument in search of its other half.
Appeals to tradition are never more than half-arguments, because some
traditions are bad ideas overdue to be replaced. Pro bono is not a bad idea,
but it carries dubious credentials as a genuine tradition. There is a longstanding tradition of lawyers' accepting uncompensated court appointments,
particularly in criminal cases, but accepting occasional court appointments is
a far cry from universal pro bono.6 The 1908 ABA Canons of Ethics make no
mention of pro bono as a professional obligation. Half a century later, the
famous ABA/AALSJoint Conference Report, the closest thing we have to an
official philosophy of legal ethics (as the organized bar of the 1950s viewed it),
argues that the legal profession bears a responsibility to make legal services,
both in litigation and in preventive advice, available to all.' Apparently the
tradition came into existence between 1908 and 1958. Before the 1960s there
was no trace of the idea that every lawyer should perform pro bono.
A moment's thought reveals the reason. It was not until the 1960s, with the
advent of consumer law, tenants' rights, and Great Society entitlement programs, that poor people had legal recourse against the ills that beset them.
Before that, they had very little use for lawyers, because they had very few legal
rights. Only when they had the rights did they acquire the need.' Societal
changes, ranging from the civil rights revolution to the divorce revolution,
generated additional legal need. Talk of a pro bono obligation emerged more
or less at the same time that talk of federally funded legal services emerged,
and for much the same reason: to address the obvious injustice of promising
new rights that provided no remedies without legal representation. Tradition,
never the strongest argument, in this case may be less than forty years old.
Legal need, at any rate, is genuine. At present about 3,500 legal services
lawyers serve the needs of 36,000,000 poor people-about one lawyer per
10,000 poor people, in contrast to the national average of one lawyer per 270
Americans. Surveys of legal needs indicate that approximately half of poor
families confront a noncriminal legal problem each year. The result is a
mountain of unmet legal need among those too poor to pay market rates
for lawyers.
Need is only a half-argument, however, because need by itself cannot
impose obligation. The universe of human need is vast and expanding; it
6.

Moreover, there is no scholarly consensus that lawyers were always compelled to accept court
appointments, or that this was recognized as a duty of the profession. Compare David L.
Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 735 (1980) (duty to
accept uncompensated court appointments has always been controversial) with Michael
Millemann, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right Question, 49
Md. L. Rev. 18 (1990) (duty to accept uncompensated court appointments is firmly rooted in
the common law).
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Lon L. Fuller &John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference
of the ABA and AALS, 44 A.BAJ. 1159, 1162 (1958).
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Some of these legal reforms were themselves the handiwork of pro bono public interest
lawyers, so it is possible that more pro bono might have led to more and quicker social
progress for the poor, but social demand for law-reform litigators is inelastic, and it hardly
justifies a call for 50 hours per year per lawyer.
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could absorb all the energies and resources of everyone not in need without
coming near to being eradicated. Only the most fervent of the utilitarian
faithful argue that we all lie under an obligation to help those in need up to
the point where additional effort would harm us more than it would help
them.9 And the utilitarian faithful are wrong.
To the argument that denying necessary legal services to the poor undermines the promise of equality under the law, the most plausible response is to
agree but to conclude that society as a whole should shoulder the responsibility of paying for legal services out of tax revenues, rather than expecting the
legal profession to make up for the effects of across-the-board economic
inequality. Viewed in this light, the call on lawyers to make up the shortfall in
taxpayer-funded legal aid through pro bono is nothing more than an unfunded mandate.
The argument from need, after all, applies to other things besides legal
services, and to other people besides lawyers, and this shows that the argument proves too much. We recognize no pro bono obligation on those with
extra bedrooms in their houses to shelter the homeless, or on pharmacists to
give medicine away to the ailing poor, or on grocers to feed the hungry at their
own expense. Indeed, one striking fact about the legal profession is that it is
the only profession to impose even an aspirational pro bono requirement on
itself. This cannot be because of need alone; the argument must appeal to
something that makes lawyers and law unique.
The Lawyer as Trustee
What makes lawyers unique is the law itself. Lawyers, unlike pharmacists or
grocers, earn their living by, in effect, vending the law, and in a democracy law
is a product of the community, operating through the mechanism of the
state. 10 That relationship differentiates law from pharmaceuticals or food or,
indeed, any other commodity. In principle, pharmaceuticals and food could
be produced and marketed without the intervention or even the existence of
the state, which confines its role to regulating and policing markets. In the
case of lawyers, the relationship is entirely different: the community, acting
through the state, produces a good (law) and entrusts lawyers to dispense and
distribute its benefits. Rather than a relationship between private producer
and private consumer, with the state looking on from outside, the "law
economy" (the system by which the benefits of law are produced, distributed,
and consumed) should be modeled differently-as a relationship between the
state as producer, its citizens as beneficiaries, and lawyers who act as trustees
administering the actual distribution of law. Commandeering Kantian lan9.

Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 229, 241 (1972).

10. In most contexts it is extremely dangerous to identify the community with the state: this is the
characteristic trope offascists and authoritarians, who invoke the name of the community for
what is in reality the will of those who control the state apparatus. As a normative proposition
about democratic regimes, however, it is no fallacy to identify the community with the state:
to the extent that the state fails to represent the community, law violates the legitimating
principle of democracy; it loses its character as law and becomes instead what H. L. A. Hart
called the "gunman writ large."
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guage, I will say that the community, acting through the state, plays a constitutive role in the law economy, rather than the merely regulativerole it plays in
the economies of other goods and professions.
In describing lawyers I use the language of trusteeship because it seems to
me that it provides the best legal metaphor for a relationship in which one
party creates a good for the benefit of someone the party wishes to care for,
and the two parties jointly compensate a third person to administer the good
and ensure that the second party enjoys its benefits. The community acting
through its state creates law for the benefit of the community's members-if it
doesn't, the law lacks legitimacy-and the state as well as individual clients
compensates lawyers for administering the law and ensuring that the
community's members enjoy its benefits. Clients compensate lawyers individually by paying fees, and the state compensates lawyers collectively by granting
oligopoly privileges akin to those of a medieval craft guild, which eliminate
competition from outside the guild and boost guild members' status and
incomes." The state also grants lawyers various public assets, such as the
12
attorney-client privilege, which make their services more valuable.

11. On the similarities between the legal profession and the medieval guilds, see Richard A.
Posner, Overcoming Law 39-60, 92-93 (Cambridge, Mass., 1995). The guild metaphor, and
the language of oligopoly, both serve to dispel a misunderstanding that has clouded some
discussions of pro bono. Many writers (including me) have described the legal profession's
"monopoly" over legal services. But, other writers object, the legal profession is bitterly
competitive, and few if any lawyers enjoy monopoly power. Roger Cramton, Mandatory Pro
Bono, 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 1113, 1135-36 (1991); Steven Lubet & Cathryn Stewart, A "Public
Assets" Theoryof Lawyers' Pro Bono Obligations, 145 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1245,1259-60 (1997).
This objection takes the term "monopoly" too literally. The critics are right that lawyers
compete vigorously with each other, so that no lawyer enjoys monopoly power. But the
profession as a whole is an oligopoly, and oligopoly has similar anticompetitive effects to
monopoly, boosting the collective base-rate enjoyed by the competitors in the profession by
excluding potential competitors from outside the profession. Anyone who doubts that the
professional oligopoly benefits lawyers should compare lawyers to architects-a profession at
least as demanding in skill and training as law, but with no oligopoly and with much lower
average compensation.
12. Lubet & Stewart, supra note 11, argue that lawyers' pro bono obligations arise as a quid pro
quo for the public assets, including confidentiality and conflict of interest rules, the attorneyclient privilege, and the work-product doctrine. They summarize the argument as follows:
In addition to the lawyer's self-generated assets, attorneys also sell certain
publicly created assets. Chief among these are certain rights of confidentiality
and enforceable duties of loyalty. Unlike the lawyer's human capital, these
assets were created by the.public, either through statutes, judicial codes of
conduct, or the operation of common law.... Because the lawyers themselves
did nothing to create the assets, but are nonetheless able to sell them at a
profit, economists would refer to this as the extraction of rents or quasi-rents.
Our argument for a mandatory pro bono obligation is that the public, having
created the assets and assigned them to lawyers, is entitled to recapture some
portion of the rent in the form of in-kind services.
Id. at 1249 (footnotes omitted). While I agree that the public assets Lubet and Stewart focus
on are part of the story of pro bono responsibilities, I find their ingenious theory unsatisfactory as the whole story. For one thing, it suggests that lawyers in jurisdictions with relatively
weak confidentiality protections, like Maryland or NewJersey, owe less by way of pro bono
than lawyers in jurisdictions with strong confidentiality protections, like California or the
District of Columbia. The latter, after all, have been assigned more valuable public assets.
The theory likewise suggests that pro bono obligations would diminish if the work-product
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The state grants lawyers oligopoly privileges in the form of unauthorized
practice rules, and it does so in a less formal but more fundamental way as
well. From the earliest days of the common law, when knowledge of the law
began to include knowledge of pastjudicial decisions, the law has developed
on the assumption that it would be administered by lawyers trained in its
"artificial reason"; law has been molded around the skills and education of
lawyers. Law and the legal profession coevolve; they are mutually pathdependent, so that no nonlawyer can expect to thrive or even survive in the
legal system unaided by a lawyer.
That is true even when "law" includes private orderings as well as public
statutes and decisions. Not only does state-made law affect the terms of private
orderings, it permeates our cultural imagination and colors the way we think
about just orderings. That is why lawyers are helpful, even essential, in their
role as "architects of social structure" (to use Lon Fuller's metaphor) .13 Whether
one understands the law on statist or pluralist terms, access to law requires
access to lawyers. As I wrote almost fifteen years ago, the community has
shaped the lawyer's retail product with her in mind; it has made. the law to
make the lawyer indispensable. 4
As a normative matter, this cannot be because the community wants to do
lawyers a favor, just as the creator of a trust is not trying to do the trustee a
favor. The point is to ensure that the benefits of law are distributed fairly, and
that requires that no members of the community be excluded from the law.
Other professions are not trustees in this way, because the community isn't the
source of their stock in trade; the community's role in other economies is
merely regulative. The community plays a constitutive role in creating the
substance of the lawyer's livelihood. Hence the pro bono responsibility: it
arises because the community creates the law and entrusts its benefits to
lawyers and lawyers alone for purposes of distribution.
The argument I have just sketched may sound like a defense of mandatory
rather than aspirational pro bono. In one sense, it is: it demonstrates that in
principle the community could impose a mandatory pro bono requirement
on lawyers without violating lawyers' moral right to be left alone. 15 But the
community is under no obligation to impose a pro bono requirement, and if a

doctrine, or the corporate attorney-client privilege, were done away with. These implications
seems implausible, and that should tip us off that the connection between these legal
doctrines and lawyers' pro bono obligations cannot be as direct as Lubet and Stewart believe.
Moreover, their exclusive focus on the handful of "public asset" legal doctrines seems to me
somewhat misplaced, because it overlooks the point that in important ways the entire body of
law is a public asset that lawyers sell. The latter emphasis, unlike the public assets theory,
makes plain why the appropriate quid pro quo for the lawyers' oligopoly on the law is pro
bono service designed to make the public product more readily available to all members of
the public who created it.
13. See Lon L. Fuller, The Principles of Social Order, ed. Kenneth I. Winston (Durham, 1981);

David Luban, Rediscovering Fuller's Legal Ethics, 11 Geo.J. Legal Ethics 801 (1999).
14. David Luban, Lawyers andJustice: An Ethical Study 286 (Princeton, 1988).
15. As I put it elsewhere, these arguments are the moral sources "of the community's right to
impose a pro bono obligation on lawyers when it is necessary." Luban, supranote 14, at 287.
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workable mandatory requirement eludes the art of the possible, there is no
reason to impose it. In that case, pro bono remains an aspirational duty.
The Question of Identity
What does the trusteeship theory imply about law teachers? Most law
schools take seriously the goal of teaching their students "professionalism"-a
word I am not fond of due to its vagueness and euphemism and air of
mystique, but which I will use nonetheless. Professionalism consists at a
minimum of knowing and following the rules of professional conduct, but it
also includes assuming the attitude of trusteeship toward the law. Professionalism includes the aspirational commitment to pro bono.
In recent years law schools have aimed to make legal ethics teaching more
pervasive, that is, to include it in all of the curriculum as well as the professional responsibility course. And law schools have tried to make the other
aspects of professionalism more pervasive as well, by sponsoring charitable
activities and fostering pro bono programs. 6 The recently published AALSsponsored survey of law school pro bono activities found that 87 percent of the
111 law schools who responded have law-related pro bono programs. Several
law schools have imposed public-service or pro bono requirements on their
students, with the stated goal of accustoming and encouraging students in the
pro bono responsibilities they will assume when they become lawyers.
Yet how can law faculties teach professionalism successfully if our own
approach to pro bono is that we wouldn't touch itwith a ten-foot pole? Most law
schools have no policy encouraging pro bono by the faculty. A recent AALS
study found that only about half the administrators of law school pro bono
programs believe that their own faculty set a good example for students.Y
If law teachers seem oblivious to the hypocrisy in encouraging students to
do something that, in both thought and action, they regard as irrelevant to
their own lives, it must be that at bottom they simply don't see themselves as
lawyers. Some teachers are quite explicit about this: a professor whose faculty
voted down a pro bono proposal reports that many of his colleagues said at the
meeting, "I'm not a lawyer. I'm an academic." This takes us to what I earlier
called the question of identity.
The genesis of the we're-scholars-not-lawyers view is easy to understand.
The one thing that all nonclinical teachers have in common is that all
have chosen teaching over law practice.' 8 For most teachers who come from
practice, that career choice signifies a watershed transformation of profes-

16. On law school pro bono, see generally Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro

Bono for Lawyers and Law Schools, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 901 (1999).
17. William Powers, Report on Law School Pro Bono Activities 2, 5 (Chicago, 1994) (reporting
pro bono requirements for students in 17 of 172 responding schools and requirements for
faculty in 3 of 105 responding schools).
18. Even the few at each school who maintain a paying law practice at least have the good taste to
tell the dean that it is only a sideline, and those who devote too much time and energy to
paying clients at the expense of scholarship are viewed by their colleagues as cheats and
featherbedders. The handful of famous professors doing high-profile trials are not regarded
as cheats and featherbedders. Instead, they attract from their colleagues a mixture of
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sional identity, a commitment to the life of the academy over the world of
practical affairs. 9
I believe this choice leads a great many law teachers to hold the world of law
practice at arm's length. Like other professional schools, law schools aspire to
full intellectual parity with the traditional academic departments and fight
against the demeaning label of "trade school." Legal scholarship always peers
over its shoulder at the strictly academic disciplines and aims to emulate their
style of achievement. I don't mean to suggest that academic law is one of the
"unconfident departments," as Ronald Dworkin calls the contemporary humanitiesq--no sane person would call law professors unconfident-but for
more than a century law schools have battled to keep their distance from
vocational schools and maintain their rightful place in the university. We warn
our students that we are not offering a bar review course. We tell them that
they can read rules on their own, while we teach them to think like lawyers.
And we shake our heads at colleagues who build their classes around war
stories or snazzy lectures on black letter. We dismiss them as insufficiently
analytical, and when, semester after semester, they get perfect scores on
their evaluations, we feel for a few moments very remote from our practiceoriented students.
In short, many of us define our professional identities not only by what we
do but also by what we don't do, namely practice law. Small wonder, then, that
some law teachers insist that their university colleagues in economics and
history, not lawyers, are their rightful peer group. To the world of the private
practice of law, with its attendant rewards and responsibilities, their attitude is
Robert Graves's: Goodbye to all that.
The Law School Economy
I want to suggest that this attitude is a form of self-deception and false
consciousness. Let us consider briefly the material conditions of university
life. Law schools are fantastically prosperous in comparison with the humanities and most of the social sciences. Philologists and art historians will retire at
a salary no higher than an untenured law teacher's. In their departments even
full professors share offices, pay their own way to the annual convention, and
curse their 100-page-a-semester photocopying allowance while they get toner
on their neckties clearing the paper paths by themselves.2' We law teachers are
grudging acknowledgment that they are good for the school, admiration for their skills, and
suspicion of their scholarly bona fides-in other words, the standard professorial reaction to
the football team. The teacher-practitioners reinforce, rather than undermining, the norm
of commitment to academia rather than practice.
19. This is not to suggest that academics in other disciplines do no pro bono. I recently spoke
with an entomologist whose department members staff a community hotline on their own
time. "Mostly," she said, "it's people calling in to find out if the spider in their toilet is going
to bite them on the butt. It's not a big deal, but people are grateful we do it."
20. Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 87, 87 (1996).
21. As J. Peter Byrne has written, "To academic colleagues pinched by the penury of the
humanities or in thrall to the labyrinthine bureaucracy of the sciences, law professors feast on
wealth and autonomy... We law professors should begin by acknowledging the clover in
which we cavort." Academic Freedom and Political Neutrality in Law Schools: An Essay on
Structure and Ideology in Professional Education, 43J. Legal Educ. 315, 315 (1993).
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the prosperous ones, and our prosperity affects more than just the size of our
offices and salaries. The fact that law schools subsidize hundreds of studentrun law reviews means that when tenure time rolls around, we submit our
papers simultaneously to manyjournals and fret only about where they will be
published, not whether. Our colleagues in other disciplines sweat out the
tenure clock while their papers languish for six months at a time on some
referee's desk before being rejected, returned, and mailed off for another
prolonged holiday. They live on the edge, while our good fortune translates
into job security.
What accounts for our prosperity? The answer is, quite simply, that we owe
it entirely to the private practice of law. Our salaries, which are large compared with those paid in the other liberal arts, are pegged to the law market. If
law firm partners earned what philologists earn, then so would we.22 Furthermore, we raise our revenue almost entirely from tuition and contributions.
Students are willing to borrow the tuition money only because they expect to
make an excellent living as practitioners; and alumni mail in their checks
because they are doing well. If the law economy collapsed, we would quickly
find ourselves in exactly the same straitened circumstances as our colleagues
in comparative literature.
Many law professors feel disdain for the world of the large law firm; they
hope that their prize students will do something else with their lives, perhaps
public interest law, perhaps teaching, perhaps government service. Sometimes this attitude arises from a Bloomsburyish aestheticism, sometimes from
political objections to what large law firms do or who they do it for. But,
regardless of the grounds, professors who hold the attitude should never
forget that without law firms and their business clients, the law school economy
would crumble. Noticing this should not stop anyone from continuing to
express disapproval of law firms who has legitimate reason to do so; but,
disapproving or not, we owe it to ourselves to be completely honest about how
utterly dependent we are on the continued success of law firms. Moreover,
those who disapprove of large law firms should also remember that many of
the firms they criticize devote millions of hours to pro bono each year; in 1996,
for example, the 93 large firms for which data exist averaged2342.9 hours of pro
bono per lawyer, for a total of more than 16,000,000 hours.
By now, the direction of my argument should be clear: I mean to argue
that because law teachers reap rewards from the private practice of law, we
have pro bono responsibilities similar to those of private practitioners, for
similar reasons.
22. It is hardly necessary to point out that legal scholarship is not better paid than other
disciplines because it is intrinsically more difficult or requires more training. It is not more
difficult, and it requires less training. A classical philologist needs to master five or six foreign
languages, including dead ones, as well as a good deal of anthropology and history in
addition to her own intellectually demanding field; an art historian learns the same five
languages, along with the chemical and microsurgical techniques needed to study, without
damaging the canvas, how Van der Weyden mixed and applied his pigments. And these are
two of the worst-paid disciplines in the College of Humanities.
23. Calculated from The Am Law 100: Pro Bono Survey, Am. Law.,July-Aug. 1997, Supplement,
at 46.
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Economic dependence does not by itself prove that law teachers have the
same pro bono responsibilities as practicing lawyers. The employees in Arnold
& Porter's mailroom are economically dependent on the private practice of
law, and they have no pro bono responsibilities. But there are additional facts
about law schools and their connection with law firms that, in my judgment,
justify the view that both belong to the same law economy, the same system of
maldistributed legal services, and consequently the same network of pro bono
responsibilities.
Recall that pro bono responsibilities derive from three propositions about
the law economy.
1. Lawyers play a unique and fundamental role in distributing law
among members of the community.
2. Economic advantages accrue to the legal profession by virtue of its
oligopoly on the provision of legal services.
3. The community, acting through its state, plays a constitutive, not
merely regulative, role in producing the goods that lawyers vend.
I believe that all three propositions are true of law schools as well.
1. Our role in distributinglegal services. Within the larger law economy, law
schools exist primarily as conduits to practice. This includes all forms of
practice, public as well as private, criminal as well as civil, transactional as well
as litigational, defense bar as well as plaintiffs' bar. Conceptually, then, law
teaching and scholarship have no special ties to private practice. But our role
in the distribution of legal services is determined by the job market our
graduates enter; and, whether we wish it to be or not, it is largely a market for
private practitioners. Our role in the distribution of legal services mirrors
rather than shapes the status quo. And so our efforts, regardless of individual
teachers' scholarly interests or political orientation or intellectual intentions',
go largely to screening, training, and evaluating law students for the benefit of
private law firms and their clients.
As a thought experiment, suppose all these functions were carried out
within law offices themselves. It is clear that the work of screening, training,
and evaluating candidates for legal employment would be performed almost
entirely by lawyers; it is now, in the case of screening, training, and evaluating
law firm associates. This shows that law teachers do work that is inseparable
both conceptually and practically from tasks that lawyers in law firms already
perform. It is distinctively lawyers' work-lawyers' work that is essential for
maintaining the existing system for the distribution of legal services. That
distinguishes the efforts of law teachers from those of other economic dependents on private law practice, like the law firm's mailroom staff.
2. Economic benefits and oligopoly. Second, as we have seen, law teachers and
law schools benefit economically from the oligopoly that private practitioners
of law enjoy. In addition, ever since university law schools displaced apprenticeship as a route into the legal profession after World War II (probably due
to the ready availability of G.I. Bill money, which made it economical to go to
school rather than articling in a law office), law schools have enjoyed an
oligopoly in the preparation of lawyers for practice. Law schools have become
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the indispensable gatekeepers of the legal profession. These facts give us
responsibilities analogous to those of practicing lawyers, to rectify the infirmities of a system that the community has entrusted to us, that we maintain, and
that benefits us.
3. The community's constitutive role in producing the good we dispense. What
about the third condition of pro bono responsibilities, the fact that the
community plays a constitutive rather than a merely regulative role in producing the good that lawyers vend? This seems less plausible when we turn from
law firms to law schools, because legal scholars do not vend law-we study it
and teach the results of our study. By way of analogy, notice that the political
science department also studies something that the community creates, namely
government. But no one suggests that political scientists have pro bono
responsibilities merely because if there were no government there would be
no political science. Why isn't exactly the same thing true of law schools?
The difference is that law schools are professional schools. We train lawyers, not scholars. This is not an accidental fact, as though it is mere happenstance that the students who attend our classes plan on practicing law after
they graduate. The needs of practicing lawyers influence the form in which we
teach (Socratically, rather than through lectures), but also the content ofwhat
we teach (theory for its own sake only in upper-level seminars; U.G.G. as a
large part of the contracts course; civil procedure in the first year). It is not
mere coincidence that we offer many sections of corporation law and tax, and
at most one or two sections of poverty law. In a deep sense, the needs of
practicing lawyers dictate the intellectual style with which we approach law:
following Holmes's advice, we study the law "as a bad man, who cares only for
24
the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict.
This is an intellectual attitude tailored entirely to the requirements of a
practitioner confronting an anxious client. At the same time that we teach
from within a practice-oriented realist attitude, broadly speaking, we marginalize
the most intellectually rigorous form of realism, law-and-society studies, precisely because they are of little use to practicing lawyers.
Thdse facts place us willy-nilly in a position somewhat different from pure
scholars. We do not merely teach how the law works, we teach how to work the
law. We are purveyors of law as well as students of it. And the community
produces the good we purvey.
In short, the same arguments that justify practicing lawyers' pro bono
responsibilities apply to law teachers as well. The law school economy and the
law economy are all one single economy-a system of delivering legal services
that fails those who lack money.
Is Law Teaching Already Public Service?
The most common reaction when I propose to colleagues that law teachers
have pro bono responsibilities like other lawyers is that the thought has never
24. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers, ed. HaroldJ. Laski,
171 (NewYork, 1920). See David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial
Essay on Holmes's ThePath of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1550, 1562 (1997).
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really occurred to them. Their response dramatically illustrates that law teachers do not think of themselves as sharing the professional identity of lawyers.
Another response, which I have heard from several colleagues, is that law
teaching is itself a kind of public service comparable to pro bono.
I think this conclusion is wrong, for at least two reasons. First of all, law
teaching in and of itself does nothing to address the problem that many
people and organizations cannot afford the legal services they need; for that
reason, whatever its public-oriented virtues, law teaching is in no way a substitute for the kind of service that the pro bono thesis requires. One colleague,
who practiced in both law firm and public interest settings, remarked to me
that teaching feels like public service. That feeling, I believe, comes not from
what teaching is, but what it is not, namely the partisan pursuit of private
interests. True, teaching is detached from the world of partisan combat and
selfish pursuits; but that does not make it pubic service. After all (and this is
the second problem with the public service argument), law teaching is paid
work, and it is hard to see why work for which one is paid, and paid comfortably, is the moral equivalent of service at no cost or reduced cost.
One of my colleagues rejoins that law teaching counts as reduced-cost legal
service because of the opportunity costs to professors of going into teachinga reference to the fact that law teachers at all ranks make less money than
large-firm lawyers of comparable seniority. The opportunity-cost argument
certainly sounds plausible whenever a law firm partner contemplates abandoning a half-million-dollar annual income tojoin a law faculty at a fraction of
that amount.
But notice one central feature of the argument: it sets the price of law
teaching by taking private practitioners as the relevant peer group. Implicitly,
then, it rejects the underlying premise of the argument that at bottom we are
scholars, not lawyers. As we have seen, if the latter argument is valid, the
relevant peer group is not private practitioners in law firms, but our university
colleagues in the classics and history departments. From their point of view,
the claim that law teaching is a form of self-sacrificing public service is
ludicrous. In the eyes of those beholders, becoming a law teacher creates no
opportunity costs, only opportunities.'
I am arguing that the opportunity-cost argument works, if at all, only when
we assimilate law teachers to the peer group of practicing lawyers-the folks
with pro bono responsibilities. It presupposes the opposite answer to the
question of identity from the we're-scholars-not-lawyers argument; the two
arguments, far from reinforcing each other, are at war with each other. And,
once the opportunity-cost argument assimilates law teachers to practicing
lawyers, its sole basis for rejecting practitioners' pro bono responsibilities
is the claim that forgone income already counts as pro bono in the relevant sense.
I cannot agree with this argument. Even accepting the doubtful premise
that law teachers could all be doing better financially in private practice, their
25. On the flip side, I think that as a group law teachers work harder and more conscientiously at
their pedagogical responsibilities than their colleagues in the arts and sciences.
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forgone income is more than compensated for by nonpecuniary benefits:
shorter and more flexible hours, greater personal autonomy, tenure, leisurely
summers, the luxury of writing and thinking whatever we want, freedom from
the anxiety of always having clients' interests in our care, and the notable
pleasure of working with appealing, enthusiastic young people rather than
stressed-out and often abrasive clients. As one colleague objects to the
opportunity-cost argument, "Nobody leaves practice for teaching unless they
want to." And there are plenty of selfish reasons why lawyers might want to.
In the end, the opportunity-cost argument fails to convince. It argues
against law teachers' pro bono responsibilities only by assimilating law teachers to practicing lawyers, the one group that has pro bono responsibilities.
This compels those offering the argument to acknowledge that they too have
pro bono responsibilities. They must then claim, very implausibly, that they
have discharged those responsibilities merely by making the lifestyle choice of
comfortably compensated professordom over stress-ridden riches.
What Should Law Teachers Do?
One colleague wrinkles her nose and asks rhetorically, "Do you really mean
that I'm supposed to go out and litigate cases? I don't want to litigate cases,
and I don't think I would be very good at it." Other friends adopt an amused
tone when they opine that they have tenured colleagues they would be afraid
to loose on a hapless client.
Perhaps they are right, although I find myself less amused when I recall that
in our clinics we send second-year law students out with three weeks' training
to represent clients in matters as important as civil protective orders and
political asylum. We expect the students to do a superb job, and by and large
a superb job is exactly what they do. What does it say about a tenured
law professor whose colleagues judge him incapable of doing even a competentjob?
Be that as it may, there is really no need for anyone to litigate cases who
doesn't wish to. There is plenty of opportunity for important pro bono work
that doesn't involve trying cases. Law teachers can write or assist in writing
amicus briefs; we can moot lawyers arguing appellate cases important to lowincome clients, who might otherwise have no such opportunities. We can
serve as expert witnesses for no fee or reduced fee. We can assist public
interest lawyers with research and help in refining novel legal theories.
We can also take cues from law firms, which often engage in innovative pro
bono work. Real estate lawyers have partnered with the corporation counsel of
the financially strapped District of Columbia to negotiate terms for office
space; others have worked to retire or restructure liens on abandoned housing
to make it available for refurbishing to house low-income tenants. Sometimes
law firms adopt a low-income neighborhood, surveying, analyzing, and trying
to solve some of its most prominent legal problems. One Minneapolis law firm
opened a store-front legal advice office, strategically located next to a
laundromat in a low-income neighborhood. Volunteer lawyers rotate into the
office one or two nights a month; other lawyers in the firm put out a plainEnglish newsletter on issues of consumer law important to low-income people.
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Lawyers from several NewYork law firms have joined in partnership with the
Open Society Institute to construct Pro Bono Net, a resource for pro bono
lawyers working on political asylum cases; plans are in the works to add other
legal specialties. These are all activities that law schools and law teachers
would be well equipped to undertake, perhaps in partnership with law firms.
Consider as well a couple of nonstandard pro bono activities that law
teachers have already undertaken:
" A tax teacher enlists students from his courses to join him in
obtaining earned income tax credit refunds for low-income clients.
" Another colleague teaches groups of inner-city high school students how to do legal and economic research in order to prepare
an economic map of their own neighborhood. The map will list the
ownership of every property and every business; it will identify
problem landlords, and determine which businesses are taking
care to deal with local suppliers. Once the high-schoolers have
prepared the map, they go to local neighborhood leaders to help
plan action around problems they have identified.
" A well-known law professor uses legal materials to teach adult
literacy-and at the same time makes her pupils far better able to
navigate a legal system that poses constant threats to their wellbeing.
In addition to activities like these, law schools offer one relatively straightforward venue by which faculty-even those like me who are not members of
the bar-can assist in delivering legal services to people of limited means.
That, of course, is the clinical program. It is entirely possible for nonclinical
faculty to cosupervise clinical cases with a clinician partner. If a nonclinical
teacher cosupervised a case or two during a semester when she is already
teaching a full load, she would undoubtedly meet her fifty-hour-per-year pro
bono commitment. She would also send a highly visible signal about professionalism from faculty to students: Thefaculty careabout helpingstudentshelp lowincome clients.
Pro Bono as an Imperfect Duty
Obviously, some semesters, some years, some stretches of five years, it may
prove too difficult to do pro bono. You have preschoolers, or you're running
the fundraiser, or you're finishing up a book, and you still have only twentyfour hours in a day. Observations like these confirm what practicing lawyers
know: that pro bono is in many cases a life-cycle event, performed some years
but neglected in others. In large law firms, it is predominantly younger
lawyers, with boundless energy and idealism and fewer commitments, who are
most eager to do pro bono work. Although many of their older partners will
do pro bono as well, the role of the partners may be more indirect-for
example, by agreeing to subsidize associates' pro bono by counting pro bono
hours as billables or collectibles, or by creating a pro bono department which
offers one- or two-year rotations, or by subduing their own anti-pro bono
partners who would create an environment hostile to associates' pro bono if
left unchecked.
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Law teachers who cannot do pro bono for life-cycle reasons can still do what
Rule 6.1 recommends: make an equivalent financial contribution to a legal
services provider. Recall that the pro bono thesis holds only that pro bono is
an imperfect duty-a duty that can at times yield to inclination or, as Kant
preferred, to other important duties. The pro bono thesis insists only that pro
bono responsibilities always function as a magnetic north, to which the compass needle eventually returns.
What Should Law Schools Do?
The comments to ABA Rule 6.1 indicate that a law firm may discharge its
pro bono responsibilities collectively, without every lawyer's doing pro bono
personally-for example, by subsidizing a pro bono department. The same
thing is possible for law schools. Indeed, it shojild be clear that many of the
innovative forms of pro bono I described earlier will require considerable
institutional and organizational support, which the law school can provide.
The AALS Commission on Pro Bono has recommended that every law school
create a staff position for a pro bono coordinator, and it would be helpful if
the office of the pro bono coordinator included staff who would help organize
faculty efforts as well as efforts by students, perhaps by negotiating cooperative
arrangements with law firms already active in pro bono.
Another way faculty can help discharge their pro bono responsibilities
through the institution of the law school is by supporting enhanced clinical
programs. The rationale for law school clinics has always been pedagogical, of
course. But it is important to realize that law school clinics are not only an
effective and indispensable part of legal education, they are also an invaluable
source of legal services for the community. We live in an era when federally
funded legal services labor under embattled budgets and draconian statutory
restrictions. Now state IOLTA programs are under serious legal attack in the
wake of Phillips. In this environment, the capacity of law school clinics to
deliver thousands of hours of desperately needed legal services looms larger in
the legal services universe. In the clinic in which I sometimes teach, students
deliver 400 to 500 hours of legal services per student per semester-the
equivalent of over $50,000 of legal services calculated at a first-year urban
associate's billing rates. Professional schools should regard themselves as
citizens of their geographical communities as well as their university and
intellectual communities, and one way to do that is to commit additional
resources to the clinics.Just as law firm partners directly subsidize associates'
pro bono efforts by counting them toward collectible hour totals, nonclinical
faculty can "subsidize" the clinics' role by supporting additional clinical appointments.
Steps like these require a culture of faculty pro bono in law schools, and
that will take time to develop. Law schools can work to develop that culture
gradually, beginning with largely symbolic steps. For example:
* incorporating Rule 6.1 into the policies of the institution, perhaps
adding it to the faculty handbook
* surveying faculty about their pro bono activities, and publicizing
the positive achievements of faculty (which, of course, also publi-
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cizes by negative inference those faculty who engage in no pro
bono)
" giving service awards to faculty members for excellence in their pro
bono efforts
* encouraging students and faculty to work together on pro bono
projects
At some point, law schools should consider formulating their own version
of the ABA's Pro Bono Challenge-a pledge of pro bono somewhat more
rigorous and demanding than Model Rule 6.1, to which hundreds of law firms
have become signatories. 26 That, however, will require coordination on the
national level. So will other things, for example formulating standards for
faculty pro bono programs that recognize the diversity of outlooks among law
faculty, or coordinating efforts to fend off the predictable assaults on law
school clinics along the lines of Louisiana's Tulane rule. But the national level
is not the place for faculty members to start. As with other moral obligations,
the place to begin is at home.

26. See Esther F. Lardent, Structuring Law Firm Pro Bono Programs: A Community Service
Typology, in The Law Firm and the Public Good, ed. Robert A. Katzmann, 78, 78-82
(Washington, 1995).

